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Abstract
In this paper, we elaborate on an idea initially developed by Weitz-
man (1998) that justiﬁes taking the lowest possible discount rate for
far-distant future cash ﬂows. His argument relies on the arbitrary
assumption that when the future rate of return of capital (RRC) is
uncertain, one should invest in any project with a positive expected
net present value. We examine an economy with a risk-averse rep-
resentative agent facing an uncertain evolution of the RRC. In this
context, we characterize the socially eﬃcient stochastic consumption
path, which allows us in turn to use the Ramsey rule to characterize
the term structure of socially eﬃcient discount rates. We show that
Weitzman’s claim is qualitatively correct if shocks on the RRC are
persistent. On the contrary, in the absence of any serial correlation in
the RRC, the term structure of discount rates should be ﬂat.
Keywords: Discount rate, term structure, certainty equivalent rate,
Ramsey rule, sustainable development.
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11 Introduction
Important policy problems dealing with public investments that aﬀect the
distant future are blossoming. The problem of how many percentage points
of growth we should sacriﬁce today in order to reduce the intensity of global
warming is a typical example. Another example comes from the aging of the
ﬁrst generation of nuclear reactors in developed countries, yielding the ques-
tion of the future of this technology of producing energy. The critical aspect
of the question is how do we evaluate the cost of nuclear wastes disposals
which will have to be checked for several thousands years. Other examples
are the problem of deforestation, genetic manipulations, biodiversity and the
like.
There are several aspects to these problems. In general, the future bene-
ﬁts of sacriﬁces that we could make today are uncertain. Also, most often,
decisions are irreversible. The uncertainty aﬀecting the future beneﬁts and
the irreversibility problem already got a correct treatment in the economics
literature. But by far the most important aspect is the intertemporal dimen-
sion of costs and beneﬁts. As is well-known, one should take into account
o ft h ed a t ea tw h i c hac o s to rab e n e ﬁt occurs by discounting it. Because
discounting is exponential, a small change in the discount rate has a large
eﬀect on the discounted value of a cash ﬂow occurring in a distant future.
The community of economists has no clear position on which discount
rate should be used for such long time horizons for which ﬁnancial markets
do not provide any pricing rule. There is a tendency among decision makers
to choose a discount rate for the very long term that is smaller than the one
used to discount cash ﬂows occurring in the short term. For example, since
2005, the French public institutions are required to use a 4% rate per year
to discount cash ﬂows up to thirty years, and to use a 2% rate for longer
horizons. A similar term structure of discount rates is also used in the U.K..
Several recent papers provided economic arguments for a decreasing term
structure of discount rates. Most of them rely on the Ramsey (1928) rule.
Extending it to the case of an uncertain growth, the socially eﬃcient discount
rate has three components. The ﬁr s to n ei st h er a t eo fp u r ep r e f e r e n c ef o r
the present. The second one is a positive wealth eﬀect: because one believes
that one will consume more in the future, decreasing marginal utility implies
that one more unit of consumption in the future has a smaller value than
the same additional unit consumed today. The third component is a nega-
tive precautionary eﬀect: because future consumption is uncertain, prudence
2should induce us to invest more for the future by reducing the discount rate.
The term structure of the discount rates is decreasing if, when considering a
longer time horizon, the wealth eﬀect increases less than proportionally, or
if the precautionary eﬀect increases more than proportionally. In the most
standard case with a power utility function and without any serial corre-
lation in the growth rate of consumption, it is well known that the term
structure of discount rates is ﬂat, which means that the wealth eﬀect and
the precautionary eﬀect are proportional to the time horizon. Gollier (2002)
shows that the term structure is decreasing if the relative risk aversion of the
representative agent is decreasing. Eﬀorts have also recently been done to
relax the assumption of the absence of serial correlation in the consumption
growth process. Weitzman (2007) considers the case of an unknown volatil-
ity of the process. This uncertainty magniﬁes the long term risk, and the
corresponding precautionary eﬀect for long maturities, yielding a decreasing
term structure. Gollier (2007) shows that the persistence of shocks on con-
sumption growth rates justiﬁes using a smaller discount rate for more distant
cash ﬂows.
Weitzman (1998, 2001) provided an interesting alternative argument that
could be summarized as follows.1 Suppose that the (continuously com-
pounded) rate θ of return on capital for the next T periods will be known
tomorrow, but is uncertain today. Consider a risk-neutral agent who must
determine today whether to invest in a risk free project that yields a single
payoﬀ x at date t per euro invested today. He should do so if and only if the
project has a positive Expected Net Present Value (ENPV), i.e., if
ENPV = −1+xEe
−h θt ≥ 0, (1)
where e θ i st h er a n d o mv a r i a b l ed e s c r i b i n gt h eu n c e r t a i n t yo ft h er a t eo fr e t u r n
on capital. The argument underlying the above condition is standard: As
soon as the interest rate e θ = θ is revealed, the investor can cash the future
beneﬁt of the investment on the credit market, which yields a present net
beneﬁte q u a l i n g−1+e−θtx. Ex ante, the risk neutral investor would invest in
the project if the expected net present beneﬁt is positive. This is equivalent






1This argument was also developed by Pazner and Razin (1974).
3It is easy to check that rp(t) is less than Ee θ, and that it tends to its lowest
p o s s i b l er a t ef o rl a r g et.2 This is the main message in Weitzman (1998). It
corresponds to the idea that a risk-neutral agent likes the randomization of
the per-period interest rate at which he will borrow. Because the net present
value of a cash ﬂow is a convex function of the interest rate, what he will be
able to borrow on average will be larger. This raises his willingness to invest
in the project. Equivalently, it lowers the critical internal rate of return at
which he would like to invest in the project. Newell and Pizer (2003), Groom,
Koundouri, Panipoulou and Pantelides (2007), and Gollier, Koundouri and
Pantelides (2008) have estimated socially eﬃcient discount rates based on
equation (2).
A si n i t i a l l yo b s e r v e db yP a z n e ra n dR a z i n( 1 9 7 5 ) ,a n dt h e nb yG o l l i e r
(2004), Hepburn and Groom (2007) and Buchholz and Schumacher (2008),
rather than cashing at date 0 the future beneﬁt on the credit market, the
agent could transfer the cost of the investment to date t by borrowing it on
the credit market. If θ is the interest rate over the period, the net future
beneﬁtw o u l de q u a l −eθt + x. Ex ante, the risk neutral agent would invest in







T h i si st h ed i s c o u n tr a t et h a ti ss u s t a i n e dt h eE x p e c t e dN e tF u t u r eV a l u e
(ENFV) approach. It is easy to check that rf(t) is larger than Ee θ,a n dt h a t
it tends to its largest possible rate when t tends to inﬁnity. Clearly, using the
ENFV and ENPV approaches yield opposite results, except in the special case
of certainty. The point here is that one needs to ﬁnd economic justiﬁcations
t ot h ee v a l u a t i o nm o d e lu s e di nac o n t e x tw h e r et h ef u t u r ei n t e r e s tr a t ei s
random. There is a huge literature on the term structure of interest rates
that examines exactly this question. But most results in this literature rely
on arbitrage, a technique that is mostly useless when considering distant time
horizons.
In this paper, we reconcile the two approaches, and we link them to
the Ramsey rule. To do this, we introduce risk aversion. We show that
the present value approach and the future value approach lead to the same
t e r ms t r u c t u r eo fd i s c o u n tr a t ea ss o o na so n et a k e sc a r eo ft h er e l a t i v e
riskiness of the diﬀerent risk transfer through time that are implicit in the
2See for example Hepburn and Groom (2007, Proposition 6).
4two approaches. In fact, if the consumption/saving strategy is optimized, the
investor should be indiﬀerent to the allocation of the investment opportunity
risk into consumption risk in diﬀerent dates. This optimality condition
implies that rules (2) and (3) adapted to risk aversion by using risk-neutral
expectations will generate the same discount rates.
In short, we solve the puzzle by endogenizing the consumption path. The
problem is that the optimal consumption path depends upon the return on
capital, and upon the uncertainty that is associated to it. Once the growth
process is derived from the exogenously given stochastic process for the re-
turn on capital, the term structure of socially eﬃcient discount rates can be
computed by the standard marginalist technique used to obtain the Ramsey
pricing rule. Thus, this paper provides a general equilibrium foundation for
the term structure of discount rates. It shows that the shape of the term
structure depends heavily upon the persistence of the shocks on e θ.
Other authors have attempted to solve the "Weitzman-Gollier puzzle".
Hepburn and Groom (2007) showed that when the investor is risk neutral,
the relevant problem is not about the allocation of risk through time, but
rather about the choice of the evaluation date, which is arbitrary by na-
ture. In their conclusion, they recognize that introducing risk aversion into
the picture would provide a road to solve the puzzle. This is exactly what
is done in this paper. Buchholz and Schumacher (2008) also recognize the
necessity to introduce risk aversion into the analysis. They propose an in-
teresting criterion in which investing at the discount rate yields the same
expected utility than investing at the uncertain rate of return of capital:
u(exp(rbs(t)t)) = Eu(exp(e θt)). They conclude that if risk aversion is large
enough, rbs is decreasing with t. Our approach diﬀers much from Buchholz
and Schumacher’s one because we do not assume that the beneﬁto ft h ei n -
vestment is consumed at the terminal date, and because we use the more
standard marginalist approach to asset pricing.
2T h e m o d e l
We consider the standard Discounted Expected Utility model with the fol-






5The utility function u on consumption is assumed to be three times diﬀer-
entiable, increasing and concave. Let ct denote consumption at date t.A t
this stage, it is assumed to be exogenous. The rate of pure preference for
the present is δ. Consider a marginal risk-free investment at date 0 which
generates a single beneﬁt ert at date t per euro invested at date 0.A t t h e




0 (ct) − Eu
0(c0). (5)
Because ∆W is increasing in r, there exists a critical rate of return denoted
rt, such that ∆W =0for r = rt. Obviously, rt is the socially eﬃcient discount
rate, which satisﬁes the following standard pricing formula:







This consumption-based pricing formula is universal. It must hold as soon
as the Discounted Expected Utility model is assumed, independent of the
structure of the risk aﬀecting the consumption process, and of the structure
of the economy.
If ﬁnancial markets would be frictionless and eﬃcient, rt would be the
equilibrium interest rate associated to maturity t. This formula is the stan-
dard asset pricing formula for riskfree bonds (See for example Cochrane
(2001)). The Ramsey (1928) rule is obtained by assuming that u(c)=
c1−γ/(1 − γ), where γ is the index of relative risk aversion, and ct = c0egt,
where g is the constant growth rate of consumption. It yields rt = δ + γg.
The larger the growth rate of consumption, the smaller the future marginal
utility of future consumption, the larger the socially eﬃcient discount rate.
This wealth eﬀect is proportional to γ, which measures the speed at which
marginal utility goes down when consumption increases.
This rule can be extended to the case of uncertainty. If lnct+1 − lnct is
normally distributed with constant mean μc and volatility σc,o n ec a np r o v e
that (see for example Gollier (2007))
rt = δ + γgc − 0.5γ(γ +1 ) σ
2
c, (7)
where gc = μc+0.5σ2
c is the expected growth rate of consumption. The third
term in the right-hand side of this extended Ramsey rule is the precaution-
ary eﬀect. The larger the uncertainty on future consumption, the larger the
expected marginal utility of future consumption (because u0 is convex), the
6smaller the socially eﬃcient discount rate. As in the standard Ramsey rule,
the term structure is ﬂat in this case. The main objective of this paper is to
reconcile this extended Ramsey rule to the Weitzman’s rule (2).
3 Linking consumption growth, return on cap-
ital, and discount rates
3.1 The case of a permanent shock on the productivity
of capital
In order to endogenize the growth process of consumption, let us suppose that
the production function exhibits constant marginal productivity of capital:
Yt = eθtKt−1.A t d a t e 0, the rate of return on capital undergoes a unique
permanent shock in such a way that the it is permanently set to θt = θ
for t =1 ,...,T.3 In this simple framework which covers the case considered
by Weitzman (1998), the characterization of the optimal consumption path
must be performed in two stages by backward induction. Let us suppose
that the capital available at date 0 is K0 and that the realization of e θ is θ.







s.t. Kt = e
θKt−1 − ct−1 ≥ 0 for all t =1 ,...,T.
KT+1 ≥ 0.





where ξ(θ)=u0(c0(θ)) is the Lagrangian multiplier associated to the in-
tertemporal budget constraint. It is a positive function of θ. Condition (8)
has an important meaning for our purpose. It states that the representative
agent is indiﬀerent at the margin about how to allocate an additional unit
of wealth obtained at t =0into consumption along her remaining lifetime.
3We assume that T is ﬁnite. The case of inﬁnite horizon would generate the same
results, but it would require that the support of the distribution of e θ be in ] −∞ ,δ[ in
order to guarantee the boundedness of the solution.
7Ex ante, it means that she is indiﬀerent about how to allocate the capital
risk generated by a marginal investment into a temporal consumption risk.
This will imply that the choice of the investment evaluation date will be ir-
relevant to determine the investment value, contrary to what Hepburn and
Groom (2007) obtained in a framework in which the consumption path is not
optimized.
Using the pricing formula (6), it implies that the socially eﬃcient dis-
count rate after e θ = θ is realized — that is for all t>0 —e q u a l srt =
δ−t−1 ln(ξe(δ−θ)t/ξ)=θ.Without surprise, in the absence of any uncertainty
ex post, the socially eﬃcient discount rate equals the rate of return on capi-
tal. We are interested in characterizing the term structure that would prevail
af e wm i n u t e sb e f o r et =0 .A tt h a tt i m e ,u0(ct) and u0(c0) are random. Using














where E0 is a risk-neutral expectation operator deﬁn e di ns u c haw a yt h a t
E0f(e θ)=Eu0(c0(e θ))f(e θ)/Eu0(c0(e θ)) for all functions f.T h i s c h a r a c t e r i z a -
tion of the term structure of discount rates is not far from the one recom-
mended by Weitzman (1998), i.e., from equation (2). In particular, the dis-
count rate rt is decreasing with the time horizon, and it tends to its smallest
possible level when t tends to inﬁnity.
Observe that, by replacing ξ(θ) by u0(c0(θ)), we have used date t =0as
the evaluation date. Following Hepburn and Groom (2007) who considered
the case of risk neutrality, one could alternatively use any date t between 1
and T,u s i n gt h ef a c tt h a tξ(θ)=u0(ct(θ))exp((θ − δ)t).E q u a t i o n ( 9 ) c a n









Notice that Eu0(ct(e θ))e
h θt/Eu0(ct(e θ)) is the certainty equivalent increase in
consumption at date t t h a ty i e l d st h es a m ei n c r e a s ei nw e l f a r et h a nas u r e
8unit payoﬀ at date 0 that is invested in the economy until t.C o n d i t i o n







where Et is an alternative risk-neutral expectation operator deﬁn e di ns u c h
aw a yt h a tEtf(e θ)=Eu0(ct(e θ))f(e θ)/Eu0(ct(e θ)) for all functions f.W h e r e a s
condition (10) looks like the Weitzman’s ENPV rule (2), the equivalent rule
(12) looks like the alternative ENFV rule (3). However, there is one im-
portant diﬀerence in this alternative rule. In equation (12), the risk-neutral
probability distribution is a function of t, whereas it is not in equation (10).
This is the nexus of the resolution of the Weitzman-Gollier puzzle. When
o n eu s e st h ep r e s e n tv a l u ea p p r o a c h ,o n ea l w a y se v a l u a t e st h ei n v e s t m e n t
opportunity risk borne by the agent in terms of an equivalent consumption
risk at the same date, date t =0 . This implies that the risk-neutral pricing
rule (10) is independent of t. When one considers the future value approach,
one evaluates the investment opportunity risk in terms of an equivalent con-
sumption risk at diﬀerent dates. Because of the consumption risk at date t
and the investment risk have a degree of correlation that is a function of t,
the risk-neutral pricing rule (12) is sensitive to t.
It must be stressed that both the present value formula (10) and the
f u t u r ev a l u ef o r m u l a( 1 0 )a r er i g h t ,a n dl e a dt ot h es a m et e r ms t r u c t u r e
of discount rate. In a sense, contrary to our conclusion in Gollier (2004),
both Weitzman (1998) and Gollier (2004) are right, as long as one takes care
of risk aversion, and the right way to distort risk-neutral probabilities as a
function of the evaluation date. However, because formula (10) relies on a
single risk-neutral probability distribution, it is easier to use.
The only diﬀerence between the correct formula (10) and the Weitzman
rule (2) is that the expectation must be computed using risk-neutral proba-
bilities. Newell and Pizer (2003), Groom, Koundouri, Panipoulou and Pan-
telides (2007), and Gollier, Koundouri and Pantelides (2008) have used a
certainty equivalent formula à la Weitzman (1998) to estimate discount rates
for diﬀerent time horizons based on an econometric estimation of the dynamic
process of short term interest rates. An interesting question is to determine
whether Weitzman’s formula (2) overpredicts the socially eﬃcient discount
rate characterized by (10). An ingredient for the following useful Lemma is
relative risk aversion, which is denoted γ(c)=−cu00(c)/u0(c).
9Lemma 1 Suppose that the productivity of capital is subject to a single ran-
dom shock that is permanent. It occurs at date t =0 . The consumption at
date t =0is an increasing (resp. decreasing) function of the observed rate of
return on capital if relative risk aversion is uniformly larger (resp. smaller)
than unity.
Proof: See the Appendix.
When relative risk aversion is larger than 1, the wealth eﬀect generated
by an increase in the productivity of capital is larger than the substitution
eﬀect, so that consumption at date 0 is increased. Now, observe that this


















This means that the Weitzman’s formula (2) overpredicts the socially eﬃcient
d i s c o u n tr a t ew h e nr e l a t i v er i s ka v e r s i o ni sl a r g e rt h a n1 . T h eo t h e rc a s e s
presented in Proposition 1 follow easily. Weitzman’s formula is exact in the
limit case of a logarithmic utility function.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the productivity of capital is subject to a single
r a n d o ms h o c kt h a ti sp e r m a n e n t .I to c c u r sa td a t et =0 . Prior to that date,
the term structure of discount rates is decreasing and tends to the small-
est possible value when the maturity tends to inﬁnity. Moreover, equation
(2) characterizes the socially eﬃc i e n td i s c o u n tr a t ei fa n do n l yi ft h er e p r e -
sentative agent is logarithmic. It overpredicts (resp. underpredicts) the so-
cially eﬃcient discount rate if relative risk aversion is uniformly larger (resp.
smaller) than 1.
The intuition of the last result in this proposition is as follows: When
relative risk aversion is larger than unity, the consumption level at date
t =0is increasing in θ. It implies that the marginal utility of wealth ξ(θ)=
u0(c0(θ)) is decreasing in θ. But the net present value of the project is
decreasing in θ. It implies that the additional discounted wealth generated
10by the investment project covaries positively with the marginal utility of
wealth. Compare this situation to the case where the covariance is zero, as
is the case with a logarithmic utility function leading to the optimality of
Weitzman’s rule. Obviously, this positive correlation provides an additional
incentive for investing in the project. It follows that the discount rate is
reduced. This is why the Weitzman’s rule overpredicts the optimal discount
rate when relative risk aversion is larger than unity.
3.2 The case of unpredictable future productivity of
capital
Let us now consider the polar case in which there is no serial correlation in
the rate of return on capital. More precisely, we assume that Yt = e
h θtKt−1,
where e θ1, e θ2,...are independent and identically distributed. In this section,
we consider for simplicity the case of inﬁnite time. The optimal consumption




h θ(K − c)).
This yields the consumption policy function c = c(K).T h eﬁrst-order con-






h θ(K − c)).
As is well-known, this problem has an analytical solution if we assume that











In this context, the consumption is proportional to wealth. It implies that
the wealth accumulation process is such that
Kt+1 = e
h θt+1(1 − C)Kt,
which implies in turn that
logct+1 − logct =l o g ( 1− C)+e θt+1. (15)
11Suppose that e θ is normally distributed with mean μθ and volatility σθ.I t
implies that logct+1 − logct is normally distributed with volatility σc = σθ
and mean












We know that the pricing rule (6) has an analytical expression (7)i nt h a t
case. Replacing μc and σc in this formula by their expression derived from
the underlying stochastic process of capital productivity yields
rt = μθ +( 0 .5 − γ)σ
2
θ. (16)
The following proposition sums up our ﬁnding.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the rate of return on capital per period follows
a random walk: e θ1, e θ2, ... are independent and normally distributed with
mean μθ and volatility σθ. Suppose also that relative risk aversion is constant.
It implies that changes in log consumption are independent and normally
distributed, and yielding in turn that the socially eﬃc i e n td i s c o u n tr a t ei s
independent of the time horizon.
Compared to Proposition 2, this proposition exhibits a completely dif-
ferent shape for the term structure. The crucial diﬀerence between the two
set of assumption is about the persistence of the shocks on the productivity
of capital. When shocks are not persistent as assumed in this section, they
have only temporary eﬀects on the growth rate of consumption, as seen in
equation (15). It implies that the precautionary eﬀect per period remains
constant with the time horizon, yielding a ﬂat term structure. On the con-
trary, when shocks are permanent, consumption paths contingent to the size
of the shock diverge exponentially, as seen from equation (8). This tends to
magnify the long term risk relative to the short term one. This magniﬁes the
precautionary eﬀect for long horizons, yielding a decreasing term structure.
4C o n c l u s i o n
Following Weitzman (1998), we considered an economy in which the exoge-
nous source of uncertainty aﬀects the rate of return on capital. From the
12stochastic process that governs this rate, we derived the optimal stochastic
process for the consumption of the representative agent. The ﬁnal aim of
this exercise was to use this consumption process to estimate the shape of
the term structure of socially eﬃcient discount rates, by using the standard
consumption-based pricing rule for interest rates. This paper builds a bridge
between two seemingly unrelated branches of the literature on discount rates:
the one based on consumption growth, and the one based on the productivity
of capital. For example, in the absence of any uncertainty on the produc-
tivity of capital, this methodology yields the standard Ramsey rule which
is consumption-based, and the discount rate equals the rate of return on
capital.
In order to explore the context implicitly considered by Weitzman (1998),
we considered an economy facing a single permanent shock on the produc-
tivity of capital. We have shown that prior to the realization of the shock,
the term structure of discount rate is decreasing and tends to the lowest pos-
sible rate of return on capital, as claimed by Weitzman. However, our model
d e r i v e st h i sr e s u l tf r o maw e l ls p e c i ﬁed social welfare function. However, the
Weitzman’s formula is correct only is the representative agent has a loga-
rithmic utility function. When relative risk aversion is larger than unity, the
Weitzman’s formula overestimates the true socially eﬃcient discount rates.
Our main contribution is to show that Weitzman’s results rely heavily on
the assumption that shocks on the rate of return on capital are permanent.
We considered alternatively a model in which shocks are only transitory. In
that alternative context, the term structure is ﬂat. In that case, one should
not discount the far-distant future at its lowest possible rate.
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15Appendix: Proof of Lemma 1










where function φ is deﬁned as φ(x)=u0−1(x). Observe that risk aversion
implies that φ is decreasing in its argument. Fully diﬀerentiating condition













Because the denominator in equation (18) is negative, the sign of ξ
0 is opposite














Observe now that, by the deﬁnition of φ,w eh a v et h a txφ
0(x)/φ(x)=
−[γ(φ(x))]
−1 , where γ(φ)=−φu00(φ)/u0(φ) is the index of relative risk aver-
sion of u. We conclude that if γ is uniformly larger (resp. larger) than 1, the
numerator in (18) is positive, so that ξ is decreasing (resp. increasing) in θ.
Finally, observe that
c0(θ)=φ(ξ(θ)).
The result follows from the fact that φ is decreasing.¥
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